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because the Supreme Court had twice
held that proceedings for the issuance of
search warrants are not open. Id. (citing
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169
(1978); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972».
Although the Supreme Court addressed
the issue in reference to the public, the
court of appeals stated that "the common
sense reason why proceedings for search
warrants are not open to the public
convinces us that the same principles
apply when the press seeks disclosure."
Id.
After rejecting the Sun's claim of a first
amendment right of access, the court examined the press's common law right of
access. The court held that at common
law the press and the public have a qualified right to judicial records. Id. at 65
(relying on Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99
(1978». "Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (g) facilitates observance of this
right by directing the judicial officer to
file all papers relating to the search warrant in the clerk's office." Id.
The court held that "the common law
qualified right of access to warrant papers is committed to the sound discretion of the judicial officer who issued the
warrant." Id. The court noted that an
abuse of discretion standard applied to
the judicial officer's decision. When
someone seeks to inspect sealed papers,
the judicial officer may deny access if
sealing is "essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." Id. at 65-66 (quotingPressEnterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501,510 (1984». In the instant case, the
magistrate and the district court both
decided that the public interest in the
investigation of crime outweighed the
Sun's interest in publishing the affidavit.
However, the court of appeals noted that
"conclusory assertions are insufficient to
allow review; specificity is required." Id.
at 66. Moreover, the district court failed
to examine the affidavit. Id.
Upon denying access to sealed papers,
the judicial officer must consider alternatives. "This ordinarily involves disclosing
some of the documents or giving access
to a redacted version." Id. In the instant
case, the magistrate complied by unsealing the warrants and the returns. However, the district court erroneously declined the government's offer to disclose
a redacted version of the affidavit. Id.
The court of appeals resolved what was
an ongoing dispute between the press
and the government. By recognizing the
Sun's common law right of access to the
affidavit, the court broadened the free26-The Law Forum/20.2

dom of speech and granted greater privileges to the press. No longer can a judicial officer rely on the government's
position and summarily seal warrant
papers. Rather, the judicial officer must
exercise independent judgment in
reaching such a decision.
-Richard E. Guida
Kosmas v. State: UNSOLICITED
STATEMENT BY WITNESS
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE
LIE DETECTOR TEST
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently reversed a defendant's murder
conviction "because the introductien of
evidence that he refused to take a lie
detector examination prejudiced his case
beyond the point that an instruction to
disregard the testimony reasonably
could be expected to effect a cure."
Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 589, 560
A.2d 1137,1138 (1989). In so ruling, the
court of appeals reversed the court of
special appeals. Moreover, this case reflects the continuing trend in Maryland
that evidence of a defendant's refusal to
submit to a lie detector exam is inadmissible and remains inadmissible even if it
is the result of a witness's unsolicited
"blurt out."
Stanley Kosmas suspected his wife
Maria was committing adultery. He hired
a private detective, retired Baltimore City
police sergeant Edward Mattson, to follow her. In early 1985, Mattson discovered Maria and her employer in a hotel
room. Two months later, Kosmas saw his
wife with the same man in her car. In December, 1985, Maria was discovered
murdered within a mile of her home.
The eldest of the Kosmas children testified that his father subjected Maria to
verbal and physical abuse and that Kosmas once threatened to kill her if she left
him.Id. at 590, 560A.2dat 1139. Mattson
testified that Kosmas offered him
$10,000 to murder Maria. Id. Kosmas,
who had an excellent reputation in his
business and home communities, denied
these allegations.
The case turned on Mattson's testimony at trial. He testified that on December 20th, Maria had been missing for four
days. That morning he went to the defendant's home where he found a detective
interviewing Kosmas. While Mattson was
on the stand, the prosecutor asked him if
he heard the content of the conversation
between Kosmas and the detective.
Mattson responded that it was "[iJust the
typical police interview" in' which the
detective asked Kosmas if he had seen his

wife or knew of her whereabouts. Id. at
592, 560 A.2d at 1140. The prosecutor
next asked Mattson, "[a)nd then you
talked to the defendant?" Id. Mattson
replied, "[t)hen I talked to [Kosmas) ....
I said, 'Would you take a lie detector?' He
said no." [d. The defendant's attorneys
immediately requested a mistrial. The
trial judge denied the motion, then instructed the jury to ignore any testimony
concerning a lie detector test. Id. at 59192, 560 A.2d at 1139-40.
The court of appeals first noted that
evidence that the defendant refused to
submit to a lie detector test was inadmissible. Id. at 592-93, 560 A.2d at 1140.
Having established this premise, the
court concentrated on the damage done
to the defendant by the inadmissible evidence and the extent to which the jury
instruction cured this damage. Id. at 594,
560 A.2d at 1141. As a result, the precise
question before the court was "whether
the prejudice to the defendant was so
substantial that he was deprived of a fair
trial." Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141.
The recent decision of Guesfeird v.
State, 300 Md. 653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984),
established factors to help answer this
question. These factors include:
whether the reference to a lie detector was repeated or whether it was a
single, isolated statement; whether
the reference was solicited by counsel, or was an inadvertent and unresponsive statement; whether the witness making the reference is the
principal witness upon whom the
entire prosecution depends; whether credibility is a crucial issue;
whether a great deal of other evidence exists; and whether an inference as to the result of the test can be
drawn.
Kosmas, 316Md.at594, 560A.2dat 1141
(quoting Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659,480
A.2d at 803).
The state emphasized that the lie detector test was mentioned only once and
that this reference was unsolicited by the
prosecutor. The court, however, responded that the state was not entirely
blameless for this "blurt-out" because
Mattson testified on behalf of the state.
Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141. The court
suspected that Mattson's fifteen years as
a police officer should have made him
aware of the inadmissibility of his statement. The court was also wary of
Mattson's motives for disclosing this evidence since he was once suspected for
the murder. !d. at 595-96, 560 A.2d at
1141-42.
Nonetheless, the court was more con-

cerned with whether Kosmas' credibility
was a crucial issue. The state's case depended on circumstantial evidence that
the defendant mistreated his wife and
that he tried to put out a contract for her
murder. The court said the evidence of
Kosmas' refusal to take a lie detector test
"cut to the heart of the defense." Id. at
597, 560 A.2d at 1142.
Finally, the curative effect of the jury
instruction was addressed. Judge McAuliffe opined that the instruction was insufficient to cure the substantial prejudice poisoning the jurors' opinion of
the defendant. He relied on Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) to
support this position. In that case, the
Supreme Court said, "[t]here are some
contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is
so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored." Kosmas, 316
Md. at 597, 560 A.2d at 1143 (quoting
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135).
Accordingly, Kosmas v. State indicates
that Maryland courts are becoming increaSingly intolerant of any evidence that
a defendant refused to take a polygraph
exam. This case also warns prosecutors
not to ask open-ended questions on direct examination unless they are confident that the information solicited will
not be substantially prejudicial to the
defendant.
-Gregory R. Smouse
Wilson v. Morris: EVIDENCE OF
PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT PATIENT
MONITORING POLICIES IS
ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE
THE STANDARD OF CARE
In Wilson v. Morris, 312 Md. 284, 563
A.2d 392 (1989), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that evidence of prior and
subsequent procedures for transporting
patients was relevant and admissible as a
consideration of the required standard
of care. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special
appeals, which had remanded the case
for a new trial.
Irene Ragland, appellee, brought an
action against a hospital director and a
county health department receptionist
as a result of personal injuries sustained
while she was a patient in the Western
Maryland Adult Day Care Treatment
Center ("the Center''). Wilson, 312 Md.
at 287,563 A.2d at 393. Ragland was returning from a doctor's office adjacent to
the Center when Ann G. Wilson, the re-

ceptionist, temporarily left Ragland unattended in a wheelchair at the top of a
handicapped access ramp. When the
wheelchair rolled down the access ramp,
Ragland fell forward on to the pedals and
fractured two vertebrae. Approximately
eighteen months prior to the accident,
and again, beginning the day after the accident, the Center's policy was for an attendant to remain with a patient while
transporting the patient between the two
facilities.Id. at 288, 563 A.2d at 393. At
the time of the aCcident, however, the
Center's policy was to have an attendant
accompany the patient to and from the
adjacent facility, but not to wait there
during the course of treatment. Id. at 288
n.5, 563 A.2d at 393 n.5. The trial court
refused to admit the evidence of the
Center's prior and subsequent practices
and concluded that such evidence was
irrelevant and inadmissible. Id. at 288,
563 A.2d at 393. The court of special
appeals reversed the trial court's ruling.
The intermediate appellate court held
that the Center's prior and subsequent
procedures demonstrated a pattern of
conduct which made those procedures
relevant and admissible. Id. at 288, 563
A.2d at 394 (citing Morris v. Wilson, 74
Md. App. 663, 668,539 A.2d 1151, 115354 (1988».
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to consider the law
under which evidence of prior and subsequent practices is admissible to prove
an alleged breach of the applicable standard of care. [d. at 289, 563 A.2d at 394.
The issue concerning the admissibility
of prior policy evidence was one of first
impression in Maryland. Consequently,
the court examined the case law of other
jurisdictions. In Welsh v. Burlington N.
R. R., 719 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. App. 1986),
an injured employee provided evidence
that a railroad company had abandoned
a policy that supplied employees with
carts for the purpose of loading propane
tanks. The Missouri Court of Appeals
held that the testimony regarding the
previous use of the carts to load propane tanks was relevant and probative on
the issue of whether the defendant was
negligent in failing to provide reasonably
safe employee equipment. Wilson, 317
Md. at 292, 563A.2d at 396 (citing Welsh,
719 S.W.2d at 797). In another case, a
woman tripped and fell upon a store
entrance floor mat. Id. (relying on Swiler
v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 277
N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1979». InSwiler, the
evidence revealed that on wet and rainy
days, it was the store owner's usual practice to tape the mat to the floor to protect

against slipping. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska ruled that the trial court propeclyallowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence relative to the store-owner's past
practice of taping or securing the mat in
question to the floor to prevent bulging.
Wilson, 317 Md. at 294, 563 A.2d at 396
(citingSwiler, 277 N.W.2d at 700).
Applying the holdings in Welsh and
Swiler, the court of appeals held the
prior practice of the Center was relevant
under the circumstances. [d. at 295, 563
A.2d at 397. The court also found the
evidence of the prior policy a material
fact to be considered in analyzing
whether the current policy was reasonably safe or whether other methods could
have been easily adopted. Id. Moreover,
the court stated that the trial judge
should consider the following test for determining whether prior policies should
be allowed as evidence:
1) The remoteness in time of the
prior policy;
2) The degree and significance of
the change in relation to the substantive issues presented;
3) The reasons for the change in
policy; and
4) The likelihood that any prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence
will outweigh the probative value of
the evidence.
Id. Thus, the court held that the Center's
prior policy of remaining with patients
taken for medical care was probative in
revealing the Center's knowledge and
perception of its duty to patients. [d. at
294-95,563 A.2d at 397.
Next, the court discussed whether
subsequent policy evidence was admissible to prove the scope of the duty of
care owed to the plaintiff. The court
recognized that there was "a standard of
care exception" to the general rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures when such evidence
"provi~es circumstantial proof that the
applicable standard of care had not been
met at the time of the accident or other
occurrence in question." [d. at 298, 563
A.2d at 395 (quoting 51. McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland Evidence § 407.1
(1987, 1989 Supp.». The court's opinion stated that although a jury should not
consider the evidence of the immediate
change in patient monitoring policies as
an admission of negligence, it was admissible as evidence of the standard of care
required under the circumstances. Id. at
301, 563 A.2d at 400. Therefore, the
court ruled that the trial judge erred in
precluding counsel from offering the
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